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The need for a law and literature canon has long been contested. Even the classic book by Richard Posner, Law
and Literature, engages the question: Although Posner ultimately believes in a canon (having “come to praise
Caesar, not to bury him”), he finds any semblance of one currently wanting. Scholars continue to challenge
the relevance of literature and literary criticism to a field like law that is sometimes more “science” than art.
Regardless of whether “law drives culture or culture drives law,” scholars can at least agree the two relate. If
there is anything around which the canon coheres, it is their sense that literature is a cultural form worth
unpacking.
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A Culture of Rights: Law, Literature, and 
Canada, by Benjamin Authers1
HEBA ISA-ODIDI2
THE NEED FOR A LAW AND LITERATURE CANON has long been contested. Even 
the classic book by Richard Posner, Law and Literature, engages the question: 
Although Posner ultimately believes in a canon (having “come to praise Caesar, 
not to bury him”), he finds any semblance of one currently wanting.3 Scholars 
continue to challenge the relevance of literature and literary criticism to a field like 
law that is sometimes more “science” than art.4 Regardless of whether “law drives 
1. (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2016).
2. BA (University of Toronto), JD (Osgoode Hall).
3. See Richard Posner, Law and Literature, 3d ed (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 
2009) at 5-6. Posner observes that:
Law and literature are very old fields, but ‘law and literature’ could not emerge as a field until 
legal scholarship and literary scholarship were no longer autonomous fields each circumscribed 
by a body of texts that did not overlap … . Literary writers and literary scholars, and legal 
practitioners and legal scholars, are at risk of becoming mutually unintelligible because 
scholarship in both fields has become so specialized and even esoteric. [Still, he maintains,] 
I have come to praise Caesar, not to bury him. Law and literature is a rich and promising field … .
 See also James Seaton, “Law and Literature: Works, Criticism, and Theory” (1999) 11:2 Yale 
JL & Human 479 (with reference to an earlier revised edition of Law and Literature, arguing 
that “[f ]or Posner, what literature may seem to teach is unimportant, since literature in any 
case is largely irrelevant to moral inquiry” at 502-504); Jeffrey Miller, The Structures of Law 
and Literature: Duty, Justice, and Evil in the Cultural Imagination (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2013) (“I found myself agreeing with Judge Posner … that the two 
disciplines didn’t have a great deal to say to each other” at 4).
4. See generally David Howarth, “Is Law a Humanity (or is it more like Engineering)?” (2004) 
3:1 Arts & Human in Higher Ed 9.
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culture or culture drives law,” scholars can at least agree the two relate.5 If there 
is anything around which the canon coheres, it is their sense that literature is a 
cultural form worth unpacking.6
A Culture of Rights: Law, Literature, and Canada represents a worthy addition 
to this scholarship and should be read by anyone even casually interested 
in constitutional law or the Novel. For Benjamin Authers, literature has 
“a constitutive role, working to delineate and perpetuate rights discourses, even 
as it is also responsive to socio-cultural norms and ideas.”7 Rather than take up 
the mantle of the humanists and argue that “the literary representation of rights 
will [necessarily] make a reader more compassionate,”8 Authers instead parallels 
representations of rights in Canadian novels and judgments and considers 
whether “literary texts” work, like their legal counterparts, to idealise Canadian 
identity “even in the breach of rights.”9
In this framing, rights are a key part of the Canadian imaginary post-Charter. 
The first point that Authers makes is trite—namely, that the Charter has been 
“held to represent Canadian values.”10 However, he then argues that the Charter, 
in “reinforc[ing] the ideology behind those values, … [has been] complicit in 
producing the idea of Canada that it is said to represent.”11 Authers theorises a 
“‘literary’ rights discourse” through which literature, “[l]ike law, … contributes 
to the ways in which rights are understood in Canada, and informs how the 
subjects of those rights conceive of their individual and collective relationship to 
a rights-based Canadianism.”12
Authers offers a number of models of idealist legal literature on the Charter.13 
He reviews scholarly and policy panegyrics by the likes of Michael Ignatieff and 
5. See Edward J Eberle & Bernhard Grossfeld, “Law and Poetry” (2006) 11:1 Roger Williams 
U L Rev 353 at 355. Eberle and Grossfeld go further, arguing “[t]he words (or ABCs) of law 
… gain real meaning only from interaction with the culture in which they operate” (ibid at 
354). See also Miller, supra note 3 (arguing “the notions informing law and justice in western 
culture share patterns and assumptions that inform every other way we express ourselves 
culturally” at 3).
6. Eberle & Grossfeld, supra note 5 at 355.
7. Authers, supra note 1 at 22 [emphasis in original].
8. Ibid at 22. See e.g. Martha Nussbaum, Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and Public Life 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1995); Martha Nussbaum, “Poets as Judges: Judicial Rhetoric and the 
Literary Imagination” (1995) 62:4 U Chicago L Rev 1477; Lynn Hunt, Inventing Human 
Rights: A History (New York: WW Norton, 2007).
9. Authers, supra note 1 at 25.
10. Ibid at 22.
11. Ibid [emphasis added].
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid at 10-15.
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Jean Chrétien, as well as the Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions in Pepsi-Cola14 
and Vriend.15 Authers’s main point of departure, however, is the case of Oakes16 
and the “idealized abstraction” of Canada it presents.17 “Canadian society is to be 
free and democratic,” wrote Justice Dickson for the majority in Oakes, and these 
values are to be realised through the Charter.18 Affirming this vision in Keegstra a 
few years later, Justice Dickson further found that section 1 “articulates Canada’s 
‘fundamental values and aspirations.’”19 In this way, the values of section 1 at 
once prescribe the limits that can be imposed on Charter rights and give these 
rights content.20
Canada, as the Court describes it, seems both to aspire to and “somehow 
presently [manifest] those fundamental values.”21 For Authers, a “complex 
temporality” is what makes this dynamic possible; he notes that while “[t]he 
Canada ‘we actually live in’ may not represent a place of rights perfection, … 
at the same time ‘we know’ such a place, because we have already imagined it 
as Canada.”22 This idea of a complex temporality, pervasive in Canada’s law and 
literature post-Charter, is essential to Authers’s argument, and is a big part of 
what makes it so compelling.
I. A NOVEL APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF RIGHTS
A ‘temporally complex’ rights framework poses obvious practical problems for 
the individual claimant: claims require resources, court cases can run years, and 
all the while the claimant’s reality remains the Canada ‘we actually live in.’
Here, Authers argues, the novel can offer resolution. He takes Joseph 
Slaughter’s work as a guide. Slaughter understands international human rights 
14. RWDSU, Local 558 v Pepsi-Cola Canada Beverages (West) Ltd, 2002 SCC 8, 
[2002] 1 SCR 156.
15. Vriend v Alberta, [1998] 1 SCR 493, 156 DLR (4th) 385.
16. R v Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103, 53 OR (2d) 719 [Oakes].
17. Authers, supra note 1 at 23.
18. Oakes, supra note 16 at para 67.
19. R v Keegstra, [1990] 3 SCR 697 at 735, 117 NR 1, cited in Authers, supra note 1 at 24.
20. See Authers, supra note 1 at 23, citing Oakes, supra note 16 at para 67. In Justice 
Dickson’s own words:
The underlying values and principles of a free and democratic society are the genesis of the rights 
and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter and the ultimate standard against which a limit on a 
right or freedom must be shown, despite its effect, to be reasonable and demonstrably justified. 
21. Authers, supra note 1 at 24.
22. Ibid at 24-25 [emphasis in original].
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as straddling “both what everyone already knows … and what everyone should 
know,” a formulation that recalls for Authers the “temporality” of Keegstra and 
Oakes.23 Slaughter looks to the Bildungsroman genre as a case study for the 
problem of bridging this gap; he argues the integration of individual and society is 
the genre’s chief conceit.24 The individual at the heart of the Bildungsroman often 
resists this process.25 Authers, too, looks to novels centering cultural assimilation 
and its growing pains. For his own study, however, he picks Canadian novels 
that reject “incorporation into society as it presently exists.”26 The rare novel that 
sanctions such incorporation tends also to foreground any “histories of rights 
violations” complicating the process.27 Authers’s first chapter is representative. 
In it, he revisits Canada’s 1988 Redress Agreement—a legislative mea culpa for 
the federal government’s “policy of dispersal” of Japanese Canadians following 
Pearl Harbour.28 Joy Kogawa’s novels Itsuka and Emily Kato form Authers’s literary 
complement,29 and he carefully unpacks the problem of “belonging” to a nation 
that has tried hard to expel you. The concern of Authers’s chosen novels, then, 
is not the “visible moment of integration” but the “futurity of a ‘what will be’ 
that is nonetheless presently conceivable.”30 In other words, their protagonists 
hope to assimilate into the “rights-based free and democratic society” that Justice 
Dickson described in Oakes, and they are not at all interested in integration with 
the Canada they actually live in.31
To what end, though, does Authers make this case? What meaningful 
understanding of the law can be drawn from a work of fiction? Jeffrey Miller has 
made an eloquent case for studying law’s meaning in (and through) literature. The 
case for law as literature, though, had been easier for him to build as a budding 
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid at 26. See also Joseph R Slaughter, Human Rights Inc: The World Novel, Narrative, 
Form, and International Law (New York: Fordham University Press, 2007) at 2-3. The 
Bildungsroman is essentially a coming-of-age novel.
25. Authers, supra note 1 at 26.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid at 31 (Japanese Canadians were offered the “choice” of internment in camps “east of the 
Canadian Rockies” or removal to Japan).
29. Joy Kogawa, Itsuka (Toronto: Viking, 1992); Joy Kogawa, Emily Kato (Toronto: 
Penguin Canada, 2005).
30. Authers, supra note 1 at 26.
31. Ibid.
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academic,32 and Miller confesses in his Structures of Law and Literature that their 
links in literature seemed at first “ephemeral, coincidental, [and] strained.”33 
He even worried Posner had been right, decades earlier, to conclude “the two 
disciplines didn’t have a great deal to say to each other.”34 For his part, Posner 
seems more concerned that we not ask them to say too much. He rues the “literary 
turn in legal scholarship”35 and identifies himself as “a formalist in literature and 
an antiformalist, a pragmatist, in law.”36 It is hard to imagine any scenario in 
which Posner might appreciate Authers’s selection of books in A Culture of Rights, 
however sincerely he praises Caesar. Posner has argued forcefully that “[t]he proper 
criteria for evaluating literature are aesthetic”:37 For the same reason a novel’s 
morals have no relation to its merits, he writes, “a mediocre work of literature is 
not redeemed by expressing moral views of which we approve.”38 He makes clear 
that the job of literature is not to be ethical, and that we must not assess it in 
those terms.39 Assuming “[t]he law and literature canon must not be defined by 
reference to a political ideology,” it follows that “[p]olitical correctness, whether 
of the Left or of the Right, should not be a criterion for inclusion or exclusion.”40 
It is not likely that Authers’s “preselection” of books by writers traditionally 
absent from the canon would pass muster here—particularly given the books 
that he has selected deal squarely with questions of social inclusion and exclusion. 
Isn’t Authers’s “choice of … novels” just an “acknowledgement of the ‘right’ of 
32. It is hard to pin law and literature’s beginnings to a year, but a number of scholars suggest 
it first really came to be in the 1970s. Richard Posner, in an earlier edition of Law and 
Literature, identified James Boyd White’s 1973 textbook, The Legal Imagination, as a clear 
pioneer. See Richard Posner, Law and Literature, revised ed (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 1998) at 4 [Posner, revised ed]; James Boyd White, The Legal Imagination 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985).
33. Miller, supra note 3 at 4.
34. Ibid.
35. Posner, revised ed, supra note 32 at 305-77.
36. Ibid at 7.
37. Ibid at 306-307.
38. Ibid at 306.
39. So compelled does Posner feel to stress this point, that in his revised edition of Law and 
Literature he classes this “aesthetic outlook” as itself moral, taking pains to oppose its “values 
of liberal individualism” to those of the so-called “edifying [that is, morally improving] 
school.” See ibid at 307 (citing “openness, detachment, hedonism, curiosity, tolerance, the 
cultivation of the self, and the preservation of a private sphere” as liberal values).
40. Posner, supra note 3 at 546.
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members of marginalized groups to be represented in the literary canon so that 
they will feel proud?”41
Fortunately, Authers does not assess the novels in his study in anything 
approaching such black-and-white terms. Itsuka, for one, was not especially well 
received by critics,42 and Emily Kato (essentially an adaptation of that novel) 
was Kogawa’s response to this reception.43 However, Authers can acknowledge 
the aesthetic failings of either novel without looking to ‘redeem’ them; he can 
argue their discursive significance for rights, and for our understanding of them, 
without labelling them especially ‘edifying.’ Authers engages with work that 
Miller, too, would likely label “propaganda,” but while he is attentive to 
“plot and theme,” he does not consequently neglect “language and metaphor, 
philology and syntax.”44 In the book’s second chapter, he highlights Margaret 
Atwood’s use of analogy in Bodily Harm45 and reads it alongside early Charter 
jurisprudence on section 2(b) and “state control of pornography.”46 Atwood and 
the Court rely similarly on analogy, he argues: through analogy, both “reveal the 
manifold aspects of harm” of individual and state representations and trace the 
41. Ibid at 479-81. As Authers notes, Posner’s charge of “preselection” by Martha Nussbaum 
is illustrative:
Another feature of Nussbaum’s choice of works to discuss is related to my earlier point that 
the literary canon must be drastically shrunk if it is to edify: they are preselected. Their take 
on social issues corresponds to her own (though she is distressed by Dickens’s hostility to labor 
unions); they were chosen to illustrate rather than to shape her moral stance. If literature were 
really believed to be a source of ethical insight, the critic would examine works of literature 
that reflected different ethical stances. … Instead the ethical position is in place before the 
examination begins, and furnishes the criteria of choice and shapes interpretation. And is 
it an accident that Maurice was written by a homosexual and Native Son by a black? Or was 
Nussbaum’s choice of these novels [as opposed to, say, Othello] a bow to identity politics—an 
acknowledgement of the ‘right’ of members of marginalized groups to be represented in the 
literary canon so that they will feel proud?
42. Authers, supra note 1 at 30.
43. Ibid.
44. Miller, supra note 3 at 8.
45. (Toronto: McLelland & Stewart, 1981).
46. Authers, supra note 1 at 48-62 (arguing the Court in Butler frames “harmful expressive 
acts … as somehow excessive to the nature of Canada”), citing R v Butler, [1992] 1 SCR 
452, 89 DLR (4th) 449 [Butler cited to SCR]. Justice Sopinka held that prohibition of 
the material in issue was justified under section 1, applying a “community standard of 
tolerance” test. See Butler at 476-78. Authers notes that this decision had consequences 
likely unintended by the Court. In particular, Butler was taken as license for a time to more 
aggressively delimit LGBT expression.
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links between “symbolic and material injury.”47 Authers parallels the interpretive 
work of novelists and judges throughout A Culture of Rights. In chapter three, 
he considers the “aesthetic requirements of the trial” (i.e., the evidentiary forms 
privileged by the trial) and the emic and etic challenges posed to it by “legal 
storytellers” and literary ones.48 In chapter four, Authers draws from law and 
literature’s “intellectual genealogy … [and] theorizes legal equality in Canada as a 
question of interpretation.”49 This time he reads Timothy Findley’s Not Wanted on 
the Voyage50 alongside the Supreme Court’s Charter jurisprudence (in particular, 
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé’s dissent in Egan), again looking to the role of analogy in 
framing and complicating categories of harm.51
Note that there are no premodern “white guys”52 here. This is largely a 
function of Authers’s subject—self-consciously Canadian (and post-Charter) 
literature—but it is also a function of his approach. Miller in his book feels 
the need to invoke our era of “assertive personal sensitivity”53 and, anticipating 
our needs, explains his choice of texts “is a matter of history and context, not 
politics.”54 He would look elsewhere “to understand literature in English,” but 
47. Authers, supra note 1 at 51.
48. Ibid at 80. The novels considered in this chapter are Alias Grace, The Barking Dog, and The 
Way the Crow Flies. For reference, see Margaret Atwood, Alias Grace (Toronto: McLelland 
& Stewart, 1996); Cordelia Strube, The Barking Dog (Toronto: Thomas Allen, 2000); 
Ann-Marie MacDonald, The Way the Crow Flies (Toronto: Alfred A Knopf Canada, 2003).
49. Authers, supra note 1 at 100.
50. (Markham, Ont: Viking, 1984).
51. Authers, supra note 1 at 101. See Egan v Canada, [1995] 2 SCR 513, 124 DLR (4th) 609.
52. Miller, supra note 3 at 9. Miller writes:
[I]f we are going to bring the politics of law and law faculties into the mix—as with, say, 
the law-and-economics crowd and the critical-legal theorists—where are the live brown girls, 
so to say? … If I want to be educated about jazz, I must listen to Louis Armstrong, Duke 
Ellington, and Thelonious Monk … . If I want to understand literature in English, I have to 
make my way through the work of a lot of dead white guys from “ethnocentric, patriarchal 
societies.” It is a matter of history and context, not politics.
 For an earlier, more thorough defence of “dead white guys” and their Great Books, see 
Richard Weisberg, Poethics, and Other Strategies of Law and Literature (New York: Columbia 
University, 1992) at xii. Weisberg argues: “There can be no principled evasion of excellent 
literature, no matter how worthy the claims of lesser-known artists, in an environment in 
which few people are being exposed to the traditional texts (ibid).” Weisberg further states 
that: “Shakespeare may have been a bourgeois white Christian male, but he stands as model 
and precursor for those whose art signifies iconoclasm. …” (ibid).
53. Miller, supra note 3 at 19.
54. Ibid at 9.
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his hands are tied: “[W]here are the live brown girls, so to say?”55 Like Miller 
and Posner, James Seaton has dismissed “the pretensions of those Critical Legal 
Theorists who deconstruct traditional moralities only to assert their own moral 
absolutes” (though, like Miller, he agrees with Posner on little else).56 Authers is 
not so dismissive. I raise this because whether the budding scholar elects to read 
law in literature or law as literature, she cannot avoid stirring debate over a third 
issue mentioned at the outset: the question of the canon. Put differently, “who 
is given voice, who [is] cited, quoted, repeated, and who marginalized, ignored, 
submerged” is of vital importance.57 Evidently, scholars continue to take up 
the canon question. And Authers, for his part, takes seriously Len Findlay’s call 
to “always Indigenize” humanities scholarship.58 Having begun his study with 
Itsuka, a critical text that nonetheless idealises “national identification” and its ties 
to rights,59 Authers closes with a chapter on Indigenous resistance. In this fifth 
chapter, he considers the varying reactions of Indigenous activists (dramatised by 
Jeanette Armstrong in Slash)60 to the arrival of the Charter and to legislative and 
judicial efforts at “constitutional inclusion.”61
“[M]oralistic” or “didactic,” however, A Culture of Rights is not.62 While 
Authers engages with critical literature, he remains sceptical of literature’s capacity 
either to transform or inform, including in the sense of fostering empathy. 
Even in their critiques, the novels in his study often “replicate legal aesthetics,” 
problematising not “the concept and idealized operation” of the law’s structures 
themselves but rather their reality in the half-formed present.63 Ultimately, 
he argues, these novels are “involved with law in the conceptual coproduction of 
cultural-legal ideas of a just society.”64 They can acknowledge concrete political 
or legal gains in the present, or lament the lack of them, but they effect the 
same sort of “deferral of rights” within their pages, and they share in the hope 
55. Ibid.
56. Seaton, supra note 3 at 503.
57. Carolyn Heilbrun & Judith Resnik, “Convergences: Law, Literature, and Feminism” (1990) 
99:8 Yale LJ 1913 at 1936. Resnik herself advocates a “feminist interruption of ‘law and 
literature.’” See ibid at 1940.
58. Authers, supra note 1 at 127, citing Len Findlay, “Always Indigenize! The Radical Humanities 
in the Postcolonial Canadian University” in Cynthia Sugars, ed, Unhomely States: Theorizing 
English-Canadian Postcolonialism (Peterborough, Ont: Broadview Press, 2004) 367.
59. Authers, supra note 1 at 44.
60. Jeanette C Armstrong, Slash (Penticton, BC: Theytus Books, 1985).
61. Authers, supra note 1 at 139.
62. Posner, revised ed, supra note 32 at 308.
63. Authers, supra note 1 at 99.
64. Ibid.
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these rights “will ultimately be made real.”65 Even Timothy Findley’s provocative 
reinterpretation of the biblical Noah, Authers suggests, relies in some ways “on 
the idealized, imagined Canada given shape by section 1 of the Charter”:66 While 
her husband Noah is eager to sight land and, with it, an end to the flood and 
its subversion of the status quo, Mrs. Noyes prefers a longer, rainier present to 
the loss of a future where “rights might [still yet] be realized.”67 Again and again, 
then, in A Culture of Rights, the “complex temporality” of the Canadian rights 
framework rears its head. This pattern is broken in chapter five of the book by 
Slash, Jeanette Armstrong’s novel about a young Okanagan man made radical by 
government inaction in the 1950s and 1960s.68 For her eponymous protagonist, 
however, there is a different temporal logic at work: The Crown has imagined for 
Slash a whitewashed past, and this past continues violently to dictate his future.69 
In the end Slash resists assimilation under Canada’s legal framework, but the 
novel named for him defies resolution.
If even literature critical of the law reproduces its forms, then, what do we 
gain from studying their interaction? Why not look to a different cultural form? 
Or a less flimsy foil for law—say, economics? Authers has posited a temporal 
problem of rights that he cannot, in this book, resolve. However, he does more in 
A Culture of Rights than defer to a more transformative literary future.
II. A CONFEDERACY OF DISCOURSES
We have seen that content and form are tightly knit in A Culture of Rights. The 
“procedural aspects of the trial,” for instance, “produce a specific style of narrative 
and so produce a truth that is a consequence of that style.”70 This is true even of 
the fictional trial, which offers shaky critical ground for the real thing.71 While 
literary representations and legal forms work “reciprocally [to] constitute meaning 
about rights,” the law often reaps the discursive spoils.72 At least, so Authers 
suggests. Since other scholars disagree, it is worthwhile to review their arguments.
65. Ibid at 44.
66. Ibid at 101.
67. Ibid at 123-24.
68. Armstrong, supra note 60.
69. Authers, supra note 1 at 142-45.
70. Ibid at 79.
71. Ibid at 88-89.
72. Ibid at 127.
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Miller argues convincingly for the importance of an “organizing principle as 
to inter-disciplinarity” in approaching either “law in … [or] law as literature.”73 
Often, this organising principle is existential—law and literature is a movement 
still at pains to define itself. Julie Stone Peters has broken the movement down 
into three chronological stages: humanism, hermeneutics, and narrative.74 
As a map of the scholarship and its varied conceits, Peters’s schematic remains 
useful. The rough lines of its divisions can be seen in Authers’s harking to 
“hermeneutics,”75 for instance, and in Posner’s disparagement of ‘narration.’76 
Peters herself, however, holds to no clear organising principle. In fact, she 
has argued that law and literature’s “interdisciplinarity” is actually ‘illusory,’ a 
conceptual crutch for both disciplines.77 She argues that legal and literary scholars 
share a mutual longing for “the real.”78 Jane Baron arrived earlier at the same 
conclusion, but by a different route. Conceding this mutual longing, she argues 
their relationship has actually in practice been unequal, with law’s “context” (and 
its “boundaries”) having been irrelevant to most law and literature scholars.79 
Per Baron, these scholars emphasise the law’s gaps in order to “make the case 
for literature,” and they want most for law to draw from literature’s well.80 Like 
Miller though, and unlike Peters, Baron sees a need for more “thoughtfulness 
about interdisciplinarity,” not less.81
If we are to be more thoughtful about this interdisciplinarity, and more 
thoughtful about the lines it draws around law’s content, how exactly should 
we define that content? Popularly understood, “the man of law … [was once] 
also a man of letters,” but he is now just as often a man of “science.”82 Critics 
of this conceptual shift have framed law instead as an “instrument for the 
conscious pursuit of social welfare,” wielded by lawyers who rightly “act as social 
73. Miller, supra note 3 at 8.
74. Julie Stone Peters, “Law, Literature, and the Vanishing Real: On the Future of an 
Interdisciplinary Illusion” (2005) 120:2 PMLA 442 at 442-46.
75. Authers, supra note 1 at 100.
76. Posner, supra note 3 at 305-307.
77. Peters, supra note 74 at 448-50.
78. Ibid at 450-51.
79. Jane B Baron, “Law, Literature, and the Problems of Interdisciplinarity” (1999) 108:4 Yale 
LJ 1059 at 1077.
80. Ibid at 1062.
81. Ibid at 1082.
82. Ibid at 1074.
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engineers.”83 The paradigm of the lawyer-scientist persists, however.84 David 
Howarth, for instance, urges that it “not be confused with the idea that lawyers 
should be ‘social engineers’”:85 The law is properly about the everyday, and the 
balance of “law and” scholarship operates at a far remove from it.86 Besides, 
however constructive literary study may be, “there is an engineering limit to 
innovation for legal structures and devices,” he argues.87 It is not a given that 
“social structures” even require lawyerly input.88
Miller differs on this point. He argues that literature helps to fill the “gap, 
sometimes huge, sometimes smaller, between law and justice.”89 Authers, 
as we know, sides with Miller, and locates this gap between the lived reality 
of Canada and the “free and democratic” Canada of the Charter. We have 
seen that (in his view) Canadian law works rhetorically to narrow this gap. 
Scholars, policy makers, practitioners, judges—legal commentators across the 
board—celebrate the Charter, its place in Canadian identity, and its potential 
to right present wrongs. Authers can acknowledge literature’s limitations,90 but 
through his literary rights discourse he sees a smoother way forward. The novel 
has fewer formal constraints than the legal text, he argues, and can ground a 
more meaningful challenge to the law’s aesthetics and “constitutive processes.”91 
He hopes for literature to inject more of ‘the real’ into rights discourses, even 
when it reproduces them. Posner, ever the legal pragmatist, would likely balk 
at this idea. Miller, too, is certain that law, “[u]nlike literature, … is meant 
83. Thomas C Grey, “Modern American Legal Thought” 106 Yale LJ 493 at 
498-99, cited in ibid.
84. Ibid.
85. Howarth, supra note 4 at 12.
86. Ibid at 13.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid at 14.
89. Miller, supra note 3 at 10.
90. Authers, supra note 1 at 28, citing Lennard J Davis, Revisiting Novels: Ideology and 
Fiction (New York: Methuen Press, 1987) (arguing the novel is “inherently ideological,” a 
conservative literary form that “by and large preserves the status quo and defends against 
radical aspirations” at 224-25).
91. Authers, supra note 1 at 99. The suitability of other literary forms for this project has been 
explored elsewhere. For a range of defences of poetry, see e.g. Eberle & Grossfeld, supra note 
5; Michelle Lerner, “Poetry as an Extension of Legal Advocacy: ‘To Pull a Fierce Gasping Life 
from the Polluted Current’” (2008) 65:1 Guild Prac 1 at 9, citing Martín Espada, “Zapata’s 
Disciple and Perfect Brie” in Martín Espada, ed, Zapata’s Disciple: Essays (Cambridge, 
Mass: South End Press, 1998) 3; Charles Reznikoff, Testimony (New York: New Directions, 
1965); M NourbeSe Philip, “Notanda” in M NourbeSe Philip, ed, Zong! (Toronto: Mercury, 
2008) 189 at 192.
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primarily to be concrete and practical, to serve a material purpose and to be 
practised as part of human existence if not experience.”92 While literature can be 
“‘practised’ by writers,” and can have a “practical … effect, literature would exist 
(at least orally) without writers.”93 “Positive law in modern, so-called developed 
societies,” on the other hand, “does not exist without practising lawyers or at 
least lawmakers” in Miller’s scheme.94 As such, his starting point is “archetypal 
or myth criticism.”95 He relies on “sacred texts” like the Old Testament to guide 
him in mapping the “broader … narrative[s] we tell ourselves about our earthly 
experience”;96 our legal system reflects a “Judaeo-Christian ethic,” so the Biblical 
myth should be our first stop.97 But where Miller seeks the mythic, Authers posits 
the law as mythic, at least post-Charter. He looks to Canadian authors who have 
tried variously to bring this myth back down to earth. Authers’s work here is 
valuable for positing a very different relationship: a law that exists meaningfully 
apart from the flawed lawyers and lawmakers who “practise” it.
To be sure, A Culture of Rights has its flaws. In the first place, Authers might 
have made his methodology more explicit. We know he picked the books he did 
because he felt their representations of rights could help to flesh out Canada’s 
“free and democratic society” and the “temporal discourses” that have proliferated 
in it with the Charter. Certainly, he makes a thorough case for their inclusion 
in the present study. The case for these books would be stronger, however, had 
Authers given us some idea of the works he excluded; Slash is the only novel 
in this study to engage directly with the Charter, after all, so presumably he 
had other search criteria (and other books in contention that met these criteria). 
It feels occasionally like Authers is arguing into the void. Also missing, for the 
generalist reader, is a surer introduction to law and literature—a closer look at 
the movement’s schisms and family resemblances would have been helpful. Still, 
Authers offers an enlightening look at the role of literature in constituting rights 
(and their discourses) in Canada, “span[ning] … the aspirational nationalism of 
the Charter to Slash’s resistance to constitutional rights.”98 He has aimed in this 
92. Miller, supra note 3 at 12.
93. Ibid.
94. Ibid.
95. Ibid at 19. For reference, see Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1957).
96. Miller, supra note 3 at 19.
97. Ibid at 11.
98. Authers, supra note 1 at 149.
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book to interrogate the nature and scope of these rights and “the forms that those 
rights take”99—a tall order. Thankfully, he proves up to the task.
A Culture of Rights adds much to Canada’s law and literature canon. Certainly, 
Authers’s temporal framework is novel. But his biggest contribution might 
yet be existential. Authers manages to do here what many a scholar thought 
impossible—find again some element of the real in law and literature.
99. Ibid at 28.
